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Abstract
Background: Although widely used in clinical practice and research, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) diagnoses have low validity: 
patients with different mental disorders can share similar symptoms, while those with the same diagnosis might have different symptoms. In fact, the DSM 
diagnostic system has been considered one of the main obstacles for further development of psychiatric research. Recently, it has been proposed that psychiatry 
nosology should be reframed according to a biologically-based etiology. Objectives: To review present and past endeavors of establishing an etiology-based 
nosology. Methods: Comprehensive review of articles on the topic. Results: From Hippocrates onwards, multiple attempts have been undertaken aiming 
to move etiology and nosology closer. The most recent efforts are represented by Developmental Psychopathology (DP) and the Research Domain Criteria 
(RDoC), which presents an operational matrix recommended to be used in clinical research instead of the DSM diagnoses. Discussion: The DSM-based 
nosology is faulty. RDoC and DP might be interesting alternatives for an etiology-based nosology. However, while DP has already brought promising results, 
RDoC is a novel proposal, whose advantages and disadvantages should gradually be identified in the upcoming years.
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Introduction
Diagnostic construct heterogeneity is one of the main challenges 
in psychiatric research and practice1-6.  For example, according to 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), 
major depressive disorder (MDD) is composed by two main 
symptoms (depressed mood and anhedonia), one of them being 
necessary for diagnosis. In addition, MDD should also present 5 or 
more symptoms out of 9 (Table 1). It is possible, therefore, that two 
patients diagnosed with depression do not have a single common 
symptom. This issue is also valid for other psychiatric disorders such 
as bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, anxiety disorders, trauma-related 
disorders and obsessive-compulsive disorder1. Moreover, DSM does 
not consider for diagnostic formulation clinical aspects such as age, 
sex, comorbidities and duration of disease7.
Heterogeneity is an issue for several reasons. Patients with the 
same diagnosis – although presenting different symptoms – will be 
treated similarly in clinical practice and in socioeconomic aspects 
(e.g., private insurance reimbursement, social security, access to health 
services). In clinical research, such patients are grouped together 
and compared to controls in studies investigating biomarkers, 
populational studies, and randomized clinical trials. Partly due to 
heterogeneity, most studies have presented negative results3.
Therefore, it is key to reappraise psychiatric nosology.  In 
fact, a recurring suggestion has been that psychiatric nosology 
should be based on the etiology of mental disorders, similarly to 
mainstream medicine8. However, there are several obstacles in this 
approach. In this article, I discuss the challenges and advances of 
this integration.  Initially, I present general concepts on nosology 
and etiology and a historical review on the attempts for their 
integration.  After that, the limitations of the current models 
are discussed.  Finally,  the concepts from two recent approaches 
are presented – the  Research Domain Criteria (RDOC)  and the 
Developmental Psychopathology (DP) framework – which might be 
helpful in the effort to develop an etiology-based nosology.
Nosology of mental disorders
Nosological categorizations can be organized into 3 major 
dimensions.  One of them distinguishes between cause and 
description.  The medical model traditionally opts for the 
former. However, as the causes of mental disorders are not known, 
the psychiatry nosological classification is based on clinical 
description, using operational criteria (i.e., a diagnosis is composed 
based on standardized criteria, as exemplified in Table 1) and 
eventually considering the course and prognosis of the described 
syndrome. This approach, present in the current DSM models, has 
problems such as the overlap between different diagnoses of signs 
and symptoms, which can also present distinct phenomenologies 
(e.g., depressed mood due to bereavement, hypothyroidism, or a 
depressive syndrome)4.
In addition, disorders can be classified categorically or 
continuously.  Discrete categories are useful for physicians as the 
patients’ disease is clearly delimitated and, therefore, a treatment can 
be straightforwardly established. The dimensional model, in turn, 
allows to examine all individuals (healthy subjects and patients) 
according to a spectrum and thus to collect more data. It is also a more 
“natural” representation for clinical symptoms that do not present a 
clear distinction between normal and pathological9.
The last dimension is between essentialism and nominalism. In the 
essentialist perspective, mental disorders are “natural types” that can 
be identified and categorized. The nominalist perspective considers 
Table 1. Major depressive disorder operational criteria
A. 5 or more of the following symptoms have been present during the same 
2-week period; at least one of the symptoms is (1) or (2)
1. Depressed mood 
2. Anhedonia
3. Weight or appetite changes
4. Insomnia/ hypersomnia
5. Psychomotor agitation/retardation
6. Fatigue or loss of energy
7. Feelings of worthlessness or guilt
8. Concentration difficulties
9. Thoughts of dying
B. Symptoms cause significant distress or impairment
C. Episode not attributable to a medical condition
E. No previous (hypo)manic episode(s)
The table shows the operational criteria for major depressive disorder. Adapted from the 5th 
version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders7.
155Brunoni AR / Arch Clin Psychiatry. 2017;44(6):154-8
that mental disorders are categories created for convenience, not 
reflecting something that “exists” naturally. “Moderate nominalism” 
admits that mental disorders “exist”, but also that their classification 
and taxonomy involve practical and operational aspects10.
Considering these dimensions, commonly used mental disorder 
frameworks can be identified, such as the “disease” (essentialist and 
categorical, understanding mental disorder as an organic and cerebral 
disease), the “altered function” (dimensional, assumes that mental 
disorder is caused by the loss or damage of a function in the brain) 
and the “biopsychosocial” (proposed by Engel and Meyer, arguing 
that psychological and social causes are as important as biological 
ones for both the etiology and the nosology of mental disorders – this 
model is essentialist and categorical, although it is balanced in the 
causalism/descriptivism dimension) models10.
Etiology of mental disorders
In a systematic review of articles that investigated the etiology of 
mental disorders, Kendler11 identified three main approaches, which 
are focused on the biological (e.g., genetic, epigenetic, molecular, 
neurochemistry and neuroimaging studies), psychological (studies 
exploring neuropsychological traits, personality traits, cognition, and 
psychiatric symptoms) or environmental (focused on the individual, 
family, society, culture or community) aspects.  Studies in these 
categories have been fairly distributed, with a slight preponderance 
of biological studies. Also, 1/3 of the studies evaluated more than 
one category (e.g., neuroimaging with neuropsychology, genetics 
with environment). From these findings, the author described some 
common paradigms used in the investigation of etiological factors 
of mental disorders.
The first one is the identification of multiple risk factors at different 
levels. This paradigm assumes that, since the effect of a risk factor 
is small, several risk factors, at different levels, should be identified 
to “sum up the different causes” of a disorder. This approach does 
not support one specific category, as the importance of a factor will 
be solely determined by its effect size11.  This paradigm, however, 
has two issues. One is methodological: risk factors variables can be 
confounding variables or epiphenomena. In addition, although the 
paradigm is theoretically pluralistic, researchers might end up valuing 
more the etiological factors that they are mostly familiar with11.
The second paradigm – elucidation of causal mechanisms – is 
employed in mechanistic studies. It uses a pragmatic approach to 
identify risk factors and cause-effect mechanisms11. This paradigm 
also has some issues, one of them being its reductionist approach. In 
addition, the “causal” factor can be a variable of confusion. In fact, 
this type of study, which generally uses a cross-sectional design, is 
prone to this type of bias. Another difficulty of this model is the 
need for a valid nosological system11. For example, the finding of 
an overactivation of the amygdala in patients with depression does 
not necessarily imply that this finding has etiological value as it is 
also observed in other disorders. In addition, depression itself is a 
heterogeneous construct12.
Nosology and etiology in Psychiatry: an historical 
overview
The earliest nosological classifications of mental disorders took place 
in ancient Greece. Hippocrates proposed that the temperaments of 
men would be caused by four humors: yellow bile, black bile, blood, 
and phlegm. The black bile would generate a melancholy temper, 
observed in philosophers and poets. At excessive levels, black bile 
would lead to melancholy13. This classification system is an etiological 
one, since mental diagnoses derive from their causes.
In the Middle Ages, insanity and madness were assumed to 
be caused either by the free will of individuals or by the influence 
of malevolent spirits. Thus, there would be no etiology, since the 
symptoms of the mind did not come from the body, but from either 
a moral or spiritual deviation13.
In Renaissance, the Ancient and Middle Ages concepts of mental 
disorder coexisted13. This apparent contradiction is consistent with 
Rene Descartes’ works (1596-1650), which defined the ontology 
of mind based on the mind-body dualism: there would be the res 
cogitans, produced by the mind, and the res extensa, the material 
reality14. 
Psychiatry emerges as a medical discipline between the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Psychiatrists were the physicians 
able to distinguish “insanities” from “nervous diseases”13. Patients 
with insanities (a concept that probably encompassed the current 
diagnoses of schizophrenia, dementia, mental retardation, epilepsy, 
and affective psychoses) were those who lost contact with reality 
and, therefore, must be alienated from society. Patients with nervous 
diseases (hysteria, anxious and depressive disorders, neuroses) in 
turn, were those who could live in society14. 
Interestingly, “insanities” would not present an etiological cause, 
being caused by moral or spiritual defects, whereas the etiology of 
nervous diseases would be the nerves and the nervous system13,14. 
Afterwards this pattern was reversed, with the identification of 
the cause of general paralysis and the neuropathological findings 
of Alzheimer’s Disease; which lead to further investigation on the 
etiology of insanities. In contrast, with the birth of psychoanalysis, 
nervous diseases were no longer associated with organic etiologies13,14.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Franco-German 
school of psychiatry advocated that mental disorders should be 
classified according to their cause.  Pinel, the father of modern 
psychiatry, argued that “insane” patients suffered from natural 
processes and not from moral or spiritual deviations. In agreement, 
Emil Kraepelin and Eugen Bleuler organized a taxonomy of mental 
disorders13.
According to its psychopathological presentation and course, 
madness was divided into dementia praecox and manic-depressive 
psychosis. Jaspers, in his book General Psychopathology, organized 
psychiatric disorders in three groups:  Group I included cerebral 
disorders such as brain tumors and meningitis, group II was 
represented by the psychotic disorders (schizophrenia, epilepsy 
and manic-depressive psychosis), and group III encompassed the 
personality disorders. Thus, mental illnesses started to be understood 
as having an organic etiology and to be organized nosologically from 
this assumption15.
Karl Jaspers argued that mental disorders should be described 
from both a comprehensive (verstehen) and an explanatory (erklären) 
perspective. This distinction is also known as the 1st vs. 3rd person 
problem, i.e., the experience of one in relation to one’s disorder 
(in “first person”) that is not appreciated by an etiology-based 
nosological framework (in “third person”)16. According to Jasper, the 
comprehensive approach should access the individual’s hermeneutic 
circle, psychic phenomena, and meaningful associations. To this end, 
the clinician must use a phenomenological approach, without causal 
preconceptions – the “pure appreciation of the facts”. The erklären, in 
turn, is the causal, “genetic” explanation of mental disorders15,16.
The early 20th century organicist view had psychoanalysis as its 
counterpoint, which was initially developed by Freud. Psychoanalysis 
claims that most mental phenomena originate from individual 
psychic conflicts, not from biological causes.  In this context, 
“nervous” diseases would have a psychological cause due to processes 
such as psychic conflicts, defense mechanisms and latent or manifest 
contents15.
Emergence of DSM
The 1st version of the DSM, elaborated in 1952, was originated 
from the US military classification manual used in World War 
Two.  This manual prioritized the classification and selection of 
soldiers mentally fit to go and remain at war, as well as to treat 
their mental disorders. The psychiatrists attending these soldiers, 
therefore, dealt mainly with dynamic and “neurotic” disorders. Thus, 
DSM-I contained terms such as “psychoneurotic neuroses” and 
“psychophysiological reactions”. Nevertheless, DSM-I, as well as the 
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DSM-II, also included biological diagnoses and some concepts of the 
Kraepelian classification17.
The first two DSM versions used no operational criteria. Rather, 
psychiatrists would have to decide, according to their best judgment, 
whether the presence of a symptom was severe enough to formulate 
a diagnosis.  Due to this subjectivity, diagnoses in the early DSM 
versions had low reproducibility15.  In fact, studies conducted in 
the 1970s showed that different psychiatrists, using DSM-II, would 
often perform distinct diagnosis for patients exhibiting similar 
symptoms.  In addition, Rosenhan’s pseudo-patient experiment 
showed that healthy volunteers, when describing false but vague 
mental symptoms, were diagnosed with severe mental disorders such 
as manic-depressive psychosis or schizophrenia18. 
In 1974, a task force led by Robert Spitzer aimed to compile 
a new version of the DSM consistent with the International 
Classification of Diseases (ICD), which was mostly used outside 
the United States.  This proposal was also consistent with the 
onset of clinical psychiatric research that required well-defined 
diagnostic constructs. The DSM-III also incorporated the findings 
from the Research Diagnostic Criteria  (RDC) and the Feighner 
criteria studies6. DSM-III adopted a neo-Krapelenian model, using 
categorical and operational diagnoses, theoretically more accurate 
and replicable than in previous DSM versions. However, DSM-III 
is considered “atheoretical”, i.e., without an etiological (biological or 
psychological) basis. The DSM-IV, developed in 1994, was similar 
to DSM-III in this regard6.
The 3rd and 4th versions of DSM brought important advances in 
contemporary psychiatric research, and lead to an increase of the 
psychopathological, epidemiological and therapeutic knowledge of 
mental disorders. However, DSM also brought several “side effects”, 
such as diagnostic “reification”, low validity of constructs, lack of 
integration with etiological advances, and exponential increase in 
the diagnosis of comorbidities6.
Despite these issues, the 5th version of DSM, presented in 
2013, maintained the same operational structure, with only minor 
changes. The task force decided not to modify it substantially as this 
could invalidate prior and ongoing research based on earlier DSM 
versions19. Thus, DSM-5, frustrating some researchers, was “more of 
the same” of its previous versions.
Challenges of traditional models for the integration 
between nosology and etiology
From its 2nd version onwards, DSM has been focusing on reliability, 
i.e., in performing  diagnoses based on reliable constructs that 
produce similar results when applied by different evaluators.  On 
the other hand, being “atheoretical”, DSM have not primarily aimed 
for validity, i.e., to which extent a given syndrome really represents 
the phenomenon being observed20. In fact, there are several types of 
diagnostic “validity”. The face validity is subjective and presupposes 
that there is a “natural type” to be measured. Operational validity 
is objective and can be divided into validity of the construct (how 
much the instrument actually measures the construct and no other 
symptoms – for example, if a depression scale measures depression 
and not anxiety), of the content (if the instrument measures all the 
aspects of what is being assessed – for example, if a depression scale 
measures all symptoms of depression) and of the criterion (if an 
independent, but theoretically related to the construct, instrument 
is associated with the construct – for example, if the measure of 
“neuroticism” – independent of the construct of depression – is 
associated with depression)20.
Concomitantly to DSM-III, Robins and Guze presented 
five criteria to ascertain the validity of a disorder. They were (1) 
identification and accurate description of signs and symptoms; (2) 
delimitation and exclusion of other disorders; (3) investigation of 
biological and etiological correlates (laboratory tests); (4) follow-up 
studies; (5) family studies. Subsequently, other criteria were added 
such as response to treatment and construct stability over time21.
Epidemiological studies further observed that criteria (1) and 
(2) could not be confirmed using DSM, as an accurate description of 
signs and symptoms was not necessary according to its operational 
criteria22. Moreover, there are only a few pathognomonic psychiatric 
symptoms, most of them being shared by several mental disorders. 
Several studies have been carried out in the past decades 
looking for biomarkers that could distinguish and delimit mental 
disorders. In this context, these studies aim to determine rare points 
between diagnoses as to “carve nature at its joints”23.
Initial studies in genetic psychiatry envisioned to find 
“causative” genes for mental disorders, particularly for those with a 
possible strong biological basis, such as schizophrenia and bipolar 
disorder. However, although family studies have indeed identified 
some risk genes, the effect size of these associations has been very low. 
Furthermore, most identified genes are not specific to a particular 
mental disorder23. 
Also in accordance to Robins and Guze’s proposal, neuroimaging 
studies have been conducted searching for “neural signatures”2 of 
mental disorders, i.e., structural or functional patterns that could be 
specifically associated with a disorder. However, the results of these 
studies also presented small effect sizes, being of little relevance from 
a clinical perspective2.
Several authors claim that the failure of psychiatric studies to 
identify “neural signatures” and to “carve nature at its joints” is due 
to the current nosological system and its heterogeneous diagnosis. In 
fact, if two patients diagnosed with depression may not present a 
single common symptom, it is unlikely that they will share neural 
signatures or risk genes. In addition, diagnoses present a significant 
overlap of symptoms and, therefore, different diagnoses might share 
mutual neural signatures and risk genes.
Proposals for an integration between etiology and 
nosology
Research Domain Criteria (RDoC)
While DSM-5 followed the same path of DSM-IV, the National 
Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) champions a fresh proposal 
through the Research Domain Criteria  (RDoC), which aims 
to  “develop, for research purposes, new ways of classifying mental 
disorders based on dimensions of observable behavior and 
neurobiological measures”5.
According to the NIMH, DSM-IV not only presents critical issues 
such as reification, lack of face validity, abundance of psychiatric 
comorbidities, and extreme diagnostic heterogeneity, but also 
discourages novel methods of research, favoring the standard “mental 
disorder vs. healthy control” comparison model3. Ultimately, these 
issues would lead to a delay in the development of new therapies, since 
heterogeneous diagnoses decrease the signal-to-noise ratio. Finally, 
DSM categorical system would inhibit a transdiagnostic approach to 
examine the causes of common endophenotypes shared by different 
disorders3.
The RDoC defends that, at least for research purposes, the classic 
model of associating etiological findings to nosological syndromes 
should be discarded.  On the contrary, RDoC initially associates 
signs and symptoms with endophenotypes to further identify 
etiologies.  For instance, symptoms of fear and anxiety are both 
associated with HPA system hyperactivity. Thus, these symptoms may 
have common etiologies. In other words, while the most common 
model of current research is to compare patients with healthy controls 
aiming to identify a disease-related biomarker, one of the models 
proposed by RDoC is to associate signs and symptoms (regardless of 
diagnosis, and even including healthy controls) with endophenotypes 
to identify common biomarkers.
The RDoC is based on 7 pillars5: (1) to use a translational 
perspective, exploring several clinical syndromes simultaneously; (2) 
to use a dimensional model, from normal to pathological;  (3) to 
develop valid and replicable methods for measuring signs and 
symptoms;  (4) in clinical trials, to have as an outcome variable a 
behavioral or neural response and not a diagnostic scale; (5) to be 
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an integrative model, also considering behavior and neural circuits; 
(6) to define nosological constructs for research applicability; (7) to 
conduct research not tied to DSM categories.
The RDoC matrix is  composed of 5 domains, each of which 
having subdomains (Table 2):
1) Domain of negative valence: fear, anxiety, sustained threat, 
loss, frustration in the absence of reward;
2) Domain of positive valence: approximation, response to 
reward, sustained response to reward (persistence), reward-based 
learning, habit;
3) Cognitive systems: attention, perception, operational memory, 
declarative memory, language, cognitive control;
4) Systems for social processes: affiliation and attachment, social 
communication, perception and knowledge of the self, perception 
and knowledge of others;
5) Activation systems: activation (arousal), biological rhythms, 
sleep-wake cycle.
Each subdomain can be further investigated in different 
levels.  For example, fear can be investigated at the genetic and 
epigenetic (BDNF, 5-HT), molecular (BDNF, serotonin), cellular 
(GABA neurons), neural (amygdala), physiological (heart rate 
variability), and behavioral (response inhibition) levels, using self-
reported scales, and through paradigms (e.g., the Trier test).
The objective of the RDoC, therefore, is to offer an ongoing 
work proposal, with constant improvement and incorporation 
of new findings, which provides an experimental, etiology-
based classification for developing psychiatric research and 
nosology. According to NIMH, one of the outcomes of RDoC may be 
the modification of current nosological systems to improve diagnosis, 
treatment, and ultimately prevention and cure of mental disorders 3,5.
Developmental Psychopathology framework 
According to Rutter24, Developmental Psychopathology (DP) is 
a conceptual model that involves a series of research methods 
focusing on psychopathological and developmental characteristics 
to ask questions about mechanisms and processes. DP has several 
assumptions, such as the expectation of diagnostic continuities 
and discontinuities;  a focus on both risk and protective factors 
(resilience); age as an ambiguous variable that reflects both biological 
maturation and accumulation of experiences; and the investigation of 
direct and indirect mechanisms of disease25. DP also contributes to 
the debate of categorical vs. dimensional classification by highlighting 
the continuities and discontinuities of various mental disorders. For 
instance, intellectual disability has a continuity between mild 
intellectual disability and normality, but a discontinuity in cases 
of severe and profound intellectual disability, the latter presenting 
relatively better defined etiologies24.
DP, similarly to the RDoC, recognizes the need for a paradigm 
shift in the current concepts of nosology and psychiatric 
research. Thus, DP and RDoC approaches are less exclusive than 
complementary.  However, RDoC has a clearer preference for the 
biological etiology of mental disorders and the identification of 
transdiagnostic endophenotypes and biomarkers; whereas PD 
considers biopsychosocial aspects and proposes the study of the 
individual throughout development.
DP, differently from RDoC, is a research model used in psychiatry 
for a longer time and has already presented results – for instance, 
findings related to the influence of psychopathology and child 
behavior in adult psychopathology, the importance of childhood 
traumas (abuse, deprivation) as risk factors for mental disorders 
in adults, the interaction between genetic load and environmental 
characteristics (gene-environment interaction) in the incidence of 
mental disorders, and the importance of parental psychopathology 
in mental disorders of childhood and adolescence24,26. 
The challenges of the DP framework include greater understanding 
of the mechanisms that lead to the onset of mental disorders in some 
patients, but not all, that present early adverse experiences or risk 
genotypes24,26. In this context, the influence of gender and age in the 
etiology of mental disorders is poorly understood. Another challenge 
is to  understand how the environment “gets inside the skin” and 
induce epigenetic and neuroendocrine changes. Gene-environment 
studies revealed, for example, increased risk for depression according 
to the genotype and the environment, but not the underlying 
biological mechanisms involved24,26.
Integration between the 1st and 3rd the person perspectives
Finally, another proposal concerning an etiology-based nosology 
system focuses on the integration between the perspectives of 
the subject and the object16.  For instance, Kapur27 proposes that 
psychosis is a “state of aberrant salience”.  The author argues that 
the dopaminergic system “provides salience” to environmental 
stimuli. In a physiological state, the hedonic motivation or attention 
to a stimulus is regulated by dopaminergic activity.  In psychosis, 
dopaminergic activity is aberrant, providing salience to neutral 
internal and external stimuli, giving rise, respectively, to delusions 
and hallucinations.  Antipsychotics, by decreasing dopaminergic 
activity, would tune down the significance of these stimuli, allowing 
them to be re-signified by the patient. In Kapur’s proposal, the “cause” 
of a mental disorder is therefore presented from the perspective of the 
1st person. Theoretically, this integrative vision could help to reduce 
the stigma of mental disorders and clinical treatment, as it explains 
to patients the causes of their illness11.
Conclusion
The DSM-based nosological classification has been widely used 
in the last four decades. It was developed in response to criticisms 
that argued that psychiatric constructs presented poor reliability. 
Presently, both DSM critics and supporters agree that the validity 
of its diagnostic constructs is low.
Despite DSM contributions to the advancement of psychiatric 
research, it is currently considered as an obstacle to future progress, 
since its constructs are heterogeneous and the signs and symptoms 
that define a syndrome overlap. Another issue is comorbidity: patients 
commonly have 2 or more diagnoses, which further confirm the 
low diagnostic validity and the impossibility of “carving nature at 
its joints”.  Etiology-focused research, such as risk genotypes and 
neural signatures, showed poor results in identifying risk factors 
useful for clinical practice and in proposing pathological mechanisms 
for mental disorders. Moreover, little progress has been observed in 
the development of new treatments for major mental disorders in 
the last 20 years. 
Recently, an etiology-based nosology system, in agreement with 
mainstream medicine, has been advocated for psychiatry. RDoC 
Table 2. Research domain criteria (RDoC) framework 
Systems Genes Molecules Cells Circuits Phisiology Behavior Self- reports Paradigms
Negative valence 
Positive valence
Cognition
Social processes
Arousal/modulation                
Adapted from Cuthbert (2015)3.
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proposes that psychiatry research should abandon the categorical 
diagnoses of DSM as to investigate the signs, symptoms and 
endophenotypes that occur in healthy individuals and in patients 
with different psychopathologies. According to RDoC creators, this 
novel framework will aid in identifying mental disorders etiologies, 
subsequently defining reliable and valid nosological constructs.
DP, in turn, uses research methods and concepts focused on 
the influence of early life events and risk genotypes as etiological 
factors for mental disorders. Although not rejecting the DSM, DP 
findings have been contributing to a review of current nosology 
based on etiology.
In summary, the proposal of an integration between nosology 
and etiology has brought heated debates in academia as it leads to 
fundamental discussions in Psychiatry – essentially, what a mental 
disorder is. Apart from this debate, most researchers agree that the 
nosological model is faulty for several reasons and, in this context, 
the proposals of RDOC and DP might be interesting alternatives 
for an etiology-based nosology. However, while the PD framework 
has already brought promising results, RDoC is a novel proposal, 
whose advantages and disadvantages will gradually be identified in 
the upcoming years.
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